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ILLEGALITY OF PLAINTIFF'S OWN USE, AS BAR TO RECOVERY
FROM UPPER RIPARIAN OWNER FOR DIVERSION.
The case of Auger & Simon Silk Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey
Water Co. et alA involves two rather novel phases of the "plain-
tiff-wrongdoer" doctrine, as applied to riparian proprietors, and
which in this particular situation caused a strong dissent by
Judges Garrison, Trenchard, Black, White and Terhune, from
the majority decision. The plaintiff had sued the defendants in
a lower court for diversion of water such as to interfere with
plaintiff's use of its dye works, and had recovered substantial
damages. On appeal the decision was reversed and new trial
awarded, on the ground that, since plaintiff's own use of the
water in its dye works so polluted the stream as to constitute a
196 AtI. (N. J.) 6o.
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public nuisance, and was thus not a reasonable use, plaintiff was
entitled to no more than nominal damages, if any.
The right of a riparian owner to a reasonable use of passing
water is appurtenant to the soil2 and its mere invasion implies
damage.3 The existence of the right does not depend upon the
actual use. A plaintiff is not bound to show that at the time he
is making any use.4 He may even, in the past, have committed
the same misuse for which he is now suing the defendant.5
Consequently when the majority opinion in the principal case
intimates that the plaintiff's misuse might bar recovery altogether
that intimation can be justified only if the .act in question falls
within one or more of certain recognized classes that so operate.
These are: (a) unlawful acts contributing as a cause (not
merely a condition) of the harm; (b) acts violating a criminal
law designed to prevent the entire transaction in which the plain-
tiff is engaged; (c) acts violating a civil or criminal law whose
main purpose is to protect an interest of the defendant's which
the plaintiff is now attempting to injure.6 Obviously the nuisance
committed here by the plaintiff in the course of its business does
not fall within the first two groups. As to the third it is not
enough to say the defendant is a member of the state, and its
interest as member is being attacked. This reasoning would
prevent suit by any law breaker. As an individual, defendant
has the right that the stream flowing past it shall not be polluted,
but this right is not being invaded for the very good reason that
plaintiff's dye works is situated lower down the stream. If then,
plaintiff's illegal action is not such as to defeat altogether its right
of recovery, should the illegality operate to reduce the damages
to a merely nominal amount?
"Damages are given as a compensation, recompense or satis-
faction to the plaintiff for injury actually received by him from
t Kraver v. Smith, 177 S. W. (Ky.) 286.
*Bolivar Mfg. Co. v. Neponset Mfg. Co., 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 241;
McEvoy v. Gallagher, 107 Wis. 331; Parker v. Griswold, 17 Conn. 288;
Newhall v. Ireson, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 595; Stotwell v. Lincoln, 77 Mass.
(ii Gray) 434; Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., Fed. Cas. 17, 323 (3"Sumn.
i89) ; Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co., Fed. Cas. 17. 516 (2 Story 661).
"Southern Marble Co. v. Darnell, 94 Ga. 231; Hogg v. Connellsville
Water Co., i68 Pa. 456; Ellis v. Tone, 58 Cal. 289.
'Watson v. Town of New Milford, 72 Conn. 561.
'Wigmore, Torts, Vol. II, p. 885.
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the defendant."'7  The measure of damages here is, roughly,
the pecuniary loss resultant from loss of use of the water includ-
ing permanent diminution in market value of the land and
improvements.8 The majority opinion in the principal case
denies that plaintiff can measure its damages by its loss in being
"deprived of the means of an illegal act."9  This denial, it will
noted, assumes two things; that value is value only in so far as
the act creating it is legal, and secondly that the whole value
lost to plaintiff by defendant's diversion had been created
solely by its illegal act- in polluting the stream. The second
assumption is undoubtedly far fetched-as an incident to the
profitable running of its dye works it may happen that the water
discharged into the stream is impregnated with refuse, but surely
this incident is not a complete cause or even essential condition.
It might je argued that deducting the expense saved-and thus
value created-by the illegal act of discharging the water used
without removing the impurities, there still remains a very con-
siderable legally created value, for whose destruction the plain-
tiff has a right to compensation. The fact that the evidence can
not establish this amount of damages with perfect certainty need
not bar recovery.10
But why is it necessary to go to that extreme? In point of
fact the plaintiff has suffered financial loss. The minority view
more logically holds that inasmuch as the illegality of the plain-
tiff's act is not so much of the essence as to deprive it altogether
of a right of action, such illegality should not speak against the
actual damage the plaintiff has sustained. "The responsibility of
the plaintiff to lower riparian owners and its liability to the state
of New Jersey or some of its public agents are distinct questions
that could not be tried out in this action."'"
C. B.
'Greenleaf, Evidence (i4th Ed.) § 253.
'Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Co., 95 Atl. (Pa.) 8o3; Jones v.
Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 3 of City of Rogers, 177 S. W. (Ark.) 888;
Wasioto & B. M. R. Co. v. Hensley, 148 Ky. 366; King v. Board of Council
of City of Danville, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 1188; Commrs. of Aberdeen v. Brad-
ford, 94 Md. 67o; Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, 45 AtI. (N. J.)
596; Gallagher v. Kingston Water Co., 164 N. Y. 6o2.
'Auger & Simon Silk Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey Water Co., supra.
"'Bigbee Fertilizer Co. v. Scott, 56 So. (Ala.) 834; Wall v. Hardwood
Mfg. Co., i27 La. 959.
"Auger & Simon Silk Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey Water Co., supra.
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IS THE DOCTRINE OF THE "POLLOCK CASE" STILL THE LAW?
In upholding the Federal Income Tax Law of 1913, under the
Sixteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court of the United States,'
in disposing of one of the adverse contentions, elaborated the
following proposition,--that the Sixteenth Amendment, authoriz-
ing the imposition of taxes upon incomes "from whatever source
derived," without apportionment, repudiates the classification of
the "Pollock case," 2 insofar as the latter held a tax upon incomes
from property to be a direct tax; and that all income taxes are,
therefore, henceforth subject to the rule of uniformity. So far-
reaching a proposition, even though not indispensable to the deci-
sion of the case, invites a critical examination.
The amendment itself 3 contains not even a remote suggestion
of a purpose to alter the constitutional classification as theretofore
judicially established. To raise by implication a purpose not sug-
gested by the language used, is at best hazardous, and not encour-
aged by the authorities.4
The language of the amendment is, however, positively adverse
to the contention of the principal case. The words "without
apportionment among the several states and without regard to
any census or enumeration," clearly correlate the amendment to
Art. I, § 2, cl. 3, of the original Constitution,5 as providing for
a special case to which the general rule laid down in the latter
clause shall not apply. A provision for an exception to a general
rule is strong evidence that but for such provision the general
rule would apply.6 It follows that the provision that income
taxes shall not be subject to apportionment, raises the presump-
tion that these taxes fall within the class which, but for such
provision, would be subject to apportionment.
Such would clearly be the construction of the language, had
the words constituted a part of the original Constitution. But
1Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. (U. S.) 236.
'Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co., 157 U. S. 429 and i58 U. S. 6oi.
'Art. XVI. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
'State v. McGough, ii8 Ala. 59, i69; State v. Dillon, go Mo. 229.
'Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. "Representatives and direct taxes shall be appor-
tioned among the several States which may be included within this Union,
according to their respective numbers, etc."
'Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (U. S.) i, i9i.
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an amendment must be presumed to be intended to be read as if
incorporated into the original instrument. 7
Historical antecedents, if invoked, confirm the view here main-
tained. The amendment was adopted as a result of dissatisfac-
tion with the conclusions of the Pollock case.8 The decision in
that case was reached after the most exhaustive consideration,
and its classification of the income tax as direct was perfectly
well known. Had the amending power desired to alter this clas-
sification it could easily have employed language for the purpose.
That it did not do so, is conclusive that its sole object was to
authorize the imposition of income taxes without apportionment,
regardless of classification.
If it be said that this literal interpretation of the amendment
results in a disturbance of the previous "all-embracing" classifi-
cation of the Constitution into direct and indirect taxes, the former
to be apportioned, the latter to be uniform,9 two answers may be
made. First, it has by no means been the unanimous opinion of
the profession that this classification was originally all-embrac-
ing.10 Second, the disturbance, if any, must be presumed to have
been intentional unless (a) the omitted restrictive or enlarging
words may be considered as taken for granted by the framers,"
or (b) the disturbance was produced by a failure to provide for
an unforeseen exceptional consequence of the literal language,
such as, if foreseen, would clearly have been obviated by specific
provision.'2 Neither of these hypotheses is here admissible. The"
previous classification of the income tax as direct had been the
subject of full discussion, and its importance clearly required any
intended alteration to be expressly provided.
Both the reasoning and the authority of the Pollock case are
precisely what they were prior to the adoption of the amendment.
If the former was valid then, it is valid now. If the latter was
binding prior to the adoption, it is binding now. If that decision
is to be overruled on the ground obliquely suggested in the earlier
case of Hans v. Louisiana,'s of an implied repudiation by the
'Ex parte Turner, 24 S. C. 211, 214.
'Prin. case, pp. 240, 241.
'lb., p. 242.
"Hylton. v. U. S., 3 Dall. (U. S.) 171, 173. Pollock v. Co., 157 U. S.,
supra, 537 (argument).
"See e. g., State v. Wilson, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 246.
"Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 518, 644. Cf.
People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375.
U134 U. S. 1, 11-12 (reviewing Chisholm v. Ga., 2 Dall. (U. S.) 419).
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amending power of an unpopular judicial decision, this is cer-
tainly a function of the amending power nowhere recognized in
the Constitution. To overrule a thoroughly argued and well con-
sidered decision, particularly through a fanciful interpretation of
an amendment, is to create a precedent which will more than
offset any protective advantage afforded by the rule of uniformity
as piow narrowly construed 14 by the courts. 5
C. R. W.
A WITHDRAWN PLEA OF GUILTY ADMISSIBLE AS AN EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION
The Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut recently decided,
that where the accused entered a plea of guilty and thereafter
withdrew it, on trial for the offense the plea was admissible as an
extrajudicial confession, inconsistent with the claim of innocence
urged on the subsequent trial, not conclusive, but requiring fur-
ther proof to establish the corpus delicti in order to justify a con-
viction. The numerous decisions in the courts of England and
the United States upon the admissibility of confessions are in a
hopeless and irreconcilable conflict, but in examining the his-
torical development of this subject and the reasons for admitting
or excluding this kind of evidence, the ruling of the principal
case seems correct in principle, and in harmony with the modem
and probable future development of the doctrine of confessions.
A plea of guilty before a grand jury or at a preliminary hearing
before a magistrate or county judge is admissible in evidence
where the defendant pleads not guilty when subsequently put on
trial.2 So, where the defendant had pleaded guilty in a police
court for violation of a municipal ordinance the fact that that plea
had been entered was admissible when he later pleaded not guilty
to an indictment for the same offense under a state statute similar
to the ordinance.' Where a plea of guilty is offered by the
" Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41.
For an extrajudicial opinion contrary to the principal case, see Graves,
The Income Tax Amendment, XIX Yale Law Journal, 5o6.
'State v. Carta, 96 At. (Conn.) 411. (Wheeler and Roraback, J3.,
dissenting.)
2Browning v. State, 142 S. W. (Tex.) I; People v. Gould, 70 Mich.
24o; Green v. State, 4o Fla. 474.
1Bibb v. State, 83 Ala. 84; Ehrlick v. Commonwealth, 31 Ky. Law Rep.
401, 102 S. W. 289.
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defendant, but refused by the court, it can not be given in evi-
dence against him on trial.4 This seems correct, because the
same facts which made the plea untrustworthy as a judicial (con-
clusive) confession of guilt would make it untrustworthy as evi-
dence of guilt to be left to the jury. When a pleading in a civil
suit is amended or withdrawn, the superseded portion disappears
from the record as a judicial admission, but by the weight of
authority it can be used as evidence against the party who with-
drew it.5 In Boots v. Canine, it is said, "We should feel that we
were doing an idle thing if we should undertake to cite authority
upon the proposition that a party can not be deprived of his right
to give in evidence an admission because the latter [the party
making it] had withdrawn it. Even in criminal cases, an admis-
sion made by the accused before the examining magistrate is not
rendered incompetent by a subsequent withdrawal. The with-
drawal of an admission may, in proper cases, go in explanation,
but it can not change the rule as to its competency. We have
never until the argument in this case known it to be asserted that
the withdrawal of a confession or admission destroyed its com-
petency as evidence against the person making it. If it did, then
criminals might destroy evidence by retractions, and parties
escape admissions by a like course. The law tolerates no such
illogical procedure. It is proper to show the withdrawal and all
attendant circumstances for the purpose of determining the
weight to be attached to the admission, but not for the purpose of
destroying its competency."
In People v. Ryan,0 it was held that after a plea of guilty had
been withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted, the former
plea of guilty was inadmissible as evidence against the accused,
but in that case it appears from the report that there was no other
evidence of guilt and the court excluded the evidence as a judicial
confession. In People v. Jacobs and Commonwealth v. Ervine8
the defendant had been permitted to withdraw a plea of guilty
and to plead not guilty, and the plea of guilty was held admissible
' State v. Meyers, 99 Mo. 1o7.
"Boots v. Canine, 94 Ind. 408, 416; Alabama Midland Co. v. Guilford,
H4 Ga. 627; Caldwell v. Drummond, (i9o3) g6 N. W. (Iowa) ii ;
Crews v. Yowell, (1903) 76 S. W. (Ky.) 126. Contra: 'Taft v. Fiske,
140 Mass. 250.
682 Cal. 6,7.
7 51 N. Y. S. 522.
"5 Dana (Ky.) 3o.
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against him as a confession. In the latter case the court said,
"And if, as is certainly the case, parole evidence of such a con-
fession made out of doors, would, in absence of proof tending to
show that it had been improperly obtained, be admissible evidence
to establish guilt, we think it unquestionable that the record of a
confession in court, unimpeached as to the manner of its procure-
ment, should be admitted. But the effect of the confession as
proof of guilt, like that of other evidence, is subject to be
repelled, and is from the nature of the proceeding, submitted to
the judgment of the jury."
In the principal case the trial judge had an opportunity to pass
on the facts which led the defendant to enter his plea of guilty
both when the plea was entered and when it was later offered as
evidence, and under the Connecticut rulings9 his finding that the
confession was not wrongly procured will not be overturned
except in a case of clear and manifest error. Applying the ortho-
dox test 0 of admissibility, it does not clearly appear that there
was such an inducement in this case as to create a fair risk of a
false confession. 11 The withdrawn plea of guilty was therefore
rightly admitted as an extrajudicial confession inconsistent with
his claim of innocence under the subsequent plea of not guilty.
S. H. S.
INJUNCTION-ANDATORY OR PROHIBITORY?
In a recent California case,' a temporary injunction was
granted restraining the City and County of San Francisco from
running an excess number of cars over terminal loops owned
exclusively by the plaintiff street railroad, and over tracks which
defendant owned in common with plaintiff. The defendant
appealed and continued to run its cars, claiming the injunction
to be mandatory in character as it required the defendant to do a
positive act by relinquishing an incorporeal hereditament which
9State v. Cross, 72 Conn. 722, 727; State v. Willis, 71 Conn. 293. See
also State v. Grover, 96 Me. 363.
"I Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 824, 83r.
I See R. v. Baldry, 2 Den. Cr. C. 430, 444; Beckman v. State, ioo Ala.
I5; State v. Jones, i45 N. C. 466, 471. Chamberlayne, The Modem Law
of Evidence, § 1485.
1 United Railroads of San Francisco v. Superior Court, I55 P. (Cal.)
463.
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it had acquired by the continued use of the cars in the manner
objected to. The court held, however, that the injunction was
essentially prohibitory in its character, as it merely restrained acts
of repeated trespass, and therefore its operation was not stayed
by appeal, as would have been the case had the injunction been
mandatory. Though the decision of the court is in accordance
with the weight of authority, the novelty of the defendant's claim
would seem to warrant a brief inquiry as to the principles
applicable to the case.
An injunction issues from a court of chancery to compel the
specific performance of a duty. This form of remedy may be
either preventative and protective, or it may be restorative. If
it be the former, it is usually called a prohibitory injunction. If
the latter, it is usually called a mandatory injunction, since it
compels the defendant to take affirmative action to restore the
plaintiff to his original situation.
2
The wrong complained of in the principal case falls within
that class of torts embracing nuisance, repeated trespass, and
continuous trespass, which equity will prevent because the legal
remedy is inadequate. Since it consists of a series of acts,
namely, the unlawful daily running of the defendant's cars over
the plaintiff's loops and tracks, it may be defined as a repeated
trespass. It differs from a continuous trespass in that the latter,
generally consisting of an erection or obstruction placed on the
plaintiff's property, is analogous to a nuisance. The inquiry then
is: What form of an injunction is necessary in each of the two
trespasses to enforce the specific performance of a duty on the
defendant's part?
Every case of a continuous trespass necessitates a mandatory
injunction for the complete enforcement of the plaintiff's right on
the one hand, and the specific performance of the defendant's
duty on the other. The court in restraining the defendant from
permitting his previous wrong to operate, compels him, in effect,
to restore the plaintiff to his former condition by removing the
obstruction or erection. It thus compels him to do an affirmative
act of destruction. Mandatory injunctions have been issued to
compel the removal of dirt,3 of logs,4 of a wall," of a sewer,'
Pomeroy's Equity, Vol. III, Sec. 1359.
, Eno v. Christ, 54 N. Y. S. 4oo.
4 White v. Codd, 39 Wash. 14.
Haitsch v. Duffy, 92 Atl. (Del. Ch.) 249.
Walther v. City of Cape Girardeau, i66 Mo. App. 467.
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of railroad tracks,7 of a stairway," when these objects were
unlawfully placed on plaintiff's property.
What form of an injunction will suffice in the case of a repeated
trespass? Since the wrong consists of a series of trespasses, not
involving the erection of any obstruction on the plaintiff's land,
an order of the court prohibiting the further commission of these
acts will be sufficient to enforce the specific performance of the
defendant's duty to keep off the plaintiff's land. Prohibitory
injunctions have been issued to restrain the soliciting of passen-
gers at a railroad station,9 the riding of a bicycle on railroad
tracks, 0 the cutting of timber on plaintiff's land,:" the shooting
of wild game on plaintiff's hunting ground,'2 and the tearing
down of the plaintiff's fences, 3 when these acts were being
repeatedly done.
In the principal case it was contended that as the acts com-
plained of were done under a claim of right, and as the running
of the excess cars had not been actually prevented by the plain-
tiff, the city was in possession of the interest claimed, and this
injunction while requiring the defendant merely to cease the
operation of its cars, really had the effect of compelling the
defendant to relinquish that interest, and therefore it was man-
datory in its character. The fact that the title or easement is in
dispute, and that in the final hearing it may turn out that the
defendant did have the title or easement in question and was
deprived of its use by the temporary injunction, is not determi-
native of the question. If there be a dispute as to the title or the
extent of the easement, the court will consider the balance of
convenience 4 and use its discretion in granting the injunction.
But if the court does grant an interlocutory decree, the question
whether the injunction is prohibitory or mandatory will depend
on whether the defendant, in order to perform specifically what
the court says is his temporary duty, will have to do affirmative
acts either of destruction or construction in order to restore the
plaintiff to his original position, or whether he will merely have
Northern Cent. Ry. Co. v. Canton Co., 65 Atl. (Md.) 337.
"Stallard v. Cushing, 76 Cal. 472.
'N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Scovil, 71 Conn. 136.
"A., T., & Santa Fe. R. Co. v. Spaulding, 69 Ka. 431.
"Griffith v. Hilliard, 64 Vt. 643.
"Kellog v. King, 114 Cal. 378.
'Ladd v. Osborne, 79 Iowa 93.
"Bacon v. Jones, 4 Mylne & Craig 433.
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to abstain from continuing certain physical acts. Ives v. Edi-
son,15 where the defendant was compelled to restore a stairway,
is on one side of the line as a plain case of a mandatory injunc-
tion, while Griffith v. Hilliard, 6 enjoining the defendant from
cutting plaintiff's timber, is on the other side as a plain case of
a prohibitory injunction. The court, in the principal case,
enjoined the defendant from operating an excess number of cars
over the plaintiff's loops and tracks. The order, in its character,
clearly operated to restrain the commission of a series of acts on
the part of the defendant and its agents. Since the defendant
was compelled to do no affirmative acts, but was merely restrained
from further commission of the acts complained of, the injunc-
tion would seem to be clearly preventative in its scope, and there-
fore prohibitory. On principle, the court's decision seems to
be correct.
F. R.
25124 Mich. 4o2.
"64 Vt. 643.
